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Sketch	for	a	Theory	of	the	History	of	Philosophy	Uriah	Kriegel				 	My	aims	in	this	essay	are	two.	First	(§§1-4),	I	want	to	get	clear	on	the	very	idea	of	a	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	the	idea	of	an	overarching	account	of	the	evolution	of	philosophical	reflection	since	the	inception	of	written	philosophy.	And	secondly	(§§5-8),	I	want	to	actually	sketch	such	a	global	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	which	I	call	the	two-streams	theory.				 I. On	the	Very	Idea	of	A	Theory	of	the	History	of	Philosophy		1.	History	vs.	Chronology		Let	us	start	with	the	distinction	between	a	history	and	a	chronology.	A	chronology	is	an	unstructured	list	of	things	that	happened	–	or	more	accurately,	a	list	structured	only	
temporally,	that	is,	by	earlier-than,	simultaneous-with,	and	later-than	relations.	Chronologies	were	prominent,	for	instance,	in	early	Greek	historiography	of	the	6th	and	5th	centuries	BCE	(think	of	Herodotus’	Histories).	Especially	when	information	is	scarce,	chronologies	are	extremely	valuable.	But	the	idea	of	a	history	connotes	something	that	goes	beyond	a	chronology.	A	history	is	not	just	a	list	of	events,	but	an	attempt	at	understanding	longitudinal	processes	of	development	(evolution)	and	break	or	turning	points	(revolutions).	Thus	history	goes	beyond	chronology	in	incorporating	an	element	of	theorization	or	interpretation	–	at	bottom:	an	attempt	at	
sense-making.	To	do	so,	it	takes	the	(nearly)	unstructured	list	of	events	and	imposes	some	structure	or	organization	on	it.	At	the	very	least,	it	supplements	the	list’s	
temporal	structure	with	a	causal	structure.	One	might	think	of	a	chronology	of	philosophy	in	a	number	of	ways.	It	could	be	a	list	of	all	philosophers,	a	list	of	all	philosophical	ideas,	or	a	list	of	all	philosophical	texts.	In	practice	focus	has	been	on	philosophers	as	the	standard	nodes	in	
 2 
philosophical	chronologies.	This	makes	certain	sense:	philosophical	texts	are	only	interesting	insofar	as	they	express	philosophical	ideas,	and	fragmentary	philosophical	ideas	coalesce	into	substantive	philosophical	conceptions,	typically,	in	the	intellects	of	individual	thinkers.	Demarcating	what	makes	a	given	thinker	a	philosopher	(or	for	that	matter	what	makes	an	idea	or	text	philosophical)	is	of	course	quite	the	chestnut,	but	let	us	bracket	this	question	here.	What	I	want	to	highlight	at	this	point	is	only	that	a	chronology	of	philosophy	is	the	starting	point	for	any	history	of	philosophy.	It	gives	us	the	material,	the	data,	for	historical	theorizing.		In	current	historiography	of	(Western)	philosophy,	in	practice	this	consists	in	two	types	of	research,	plus	an	outlier.	The	first	type	of	research	is	work	on	the	correct	interpretation	of	an	individual	thinker:	Was	Boethius	really	a	nominalist?	What	did	Leibniz	mean	with	his	cryptic	but	foundational	remark	that	the	monads	have	no	windows?	What	exactly	was	Russell’s	theory	of	judgment?	The	other	line	of	research	concerns	the	(re)discovery	of	unknown	or	lesser-known	thinkers	and	interpretation	of	their	ideas.	The	recent	flourish	of	research	into	non-canonized	thinkers,	often	female,	falls	within	this	line.	Who	was	George	Stout	and	what	were	his	distinctive	philosophical	accomplishments?	Who	was	Margaret	Cavendish	and	what	exactly	was	her	position	on	the	mind-body	problem?	Who	was	Gersonides	and	what	was	his	distinctive	contribution	to	Jewish	Averroism?	Answers	to	such	questions	constitute	contributions	toward	an	accurate	chronology	of	philosophy.	In	addition,	and	this	is	more	of	an	outlier	in	the	historiography	of	philosophy,	some	historians	occasionally	attempt	to	synthesize	others’	interpretive	work	into	something	like	a	self-conscious	chronology.	In	current	research	the	gold	standard	for	this	is	Peter	Adamson’s	masterful	series	of	books	on	the	“history	of	philosophy	without	any	gaps.”		On	the	basis	of	chronologies	devised	and	refined	through	these	types	of	research,	one	may	then	go	on	to	theorize	about	the	unfolding	over	time	of	philosophical	ideas.	But	what	does	“theorizing”	on	the	history	of	philosophy	consist	in?			2.	What	is	a	Theory	of	the	History	of	Philosophy?	Modeling	again	on	general	historiography,	I	wish	to	distinguish	four	main	stages	of	potential	theorizing	in	the	historiography	of	philosophy.	They	correspond	to	(i)	singular	causation,	(ii)	processes,	(iii)	causal	laws,	and	(iv)	overall	or	“total”	theory.			 Given	a	complete	chronology	of	things	that	happened,	one	might	wish	in	the	first	instance	to	identify	individual	causal	links	between	two	particular	events.	This	is	singular	causation:	the	throwing	of	the	rock	caused	the	shuttering	of	the	window,	the	
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crash	caused	the	explosion,	and	so	on.	Identifying	individual	causal	links	is	the	first	stage	of	historical	sense-making.	The	second	stage	is	the	identification	of	certain	chains	of	singular-causal	links.	We	may	think	of	sequences	of	such	individual	causal	links	that	exhibit	the	right	kind	of	internal	cohesion	as	processes,	leading	non-accidentally	from	a	start	point	to	an	end	point.	This	is	probably	the	level	of	analysis	that	characterizes	most	closely	academic	historians’	research	nowadays.		A	third	and	more	ambitious	stage	of	historical	theorizing,	one	that	definitely	does	not	characterize	typical	historiographic	research	these	days,	would	attempt	to	identify	laws	of	history.	We	move	from	singular	causation	to	causal	laws	when	we	notice	that	token	events	exemplifying	certain	event-types	tend	to	cause	token	events	that	exemplify	other	event-types.	The	causal	law	links	the	event	types:	the	throwing	of	rocks	of	such-and-such	weight	tends	to	cause	the	shuttering	of	windows	of	such-and-
such	density.	It	is	healthy,	of	course,	to	approach	the	history	of	humanity	with	a	certain	skepticism	about	the	very	existence	of	such	laws;	but	arguably,	it	is	with	the	introduction	of	such	historical	laws,	if	such	there	be,	that	history	would	earn	its	status	as	a	science	(on	this,	see	Comte’s	Cours).	Finally,	we	can	envisage,	even	more	speculatively,	that	there	is	a	single	unified	structure	to	human	history	as	a	whole.	This	is	what	I	called	“total	history.”	The	best-known	example	of	this	is	probably	Hegel’s	dialectical	theory	of	history	in	terms	of	the	progress	of	the	human	spirit,	embodied	in	the	state,	through	three	stages	of	ever	increasing	freedom:	from	the	early	Asian	empires	(notably	China	and	Persia),	where	only	the	despot	was	free,	through	the	Greco-Roman	world	where	only	the	ruling	elites	were	free,	to	the	German	world	(what	else?),	where	everybody	is	free.	If	it	was	healthy	to	approach	with	skepticism	the	notion	of	historical	law,	it	is	positively	unhealthy	not	to	approach	with	skepticism	the	idea	of	an	overall	pattern	in	(or	direction	of)	history;	nonetheless	a	total	theory	represents	the	holy	grail	of	historiography,	parallel	in	some	respects	to	the	unification	of	quantum	mechanics	and	relativity	into	a	single	overarching	theory	of	fundamental	physics.			 As	with	general	historiography,	research	in	the	historiography	of	philosophy	is	rife	that	targets	individual	causal	links,	in	this	case	between	individual	thinkers.	When	we	study	Aristotle’s	influence	on	Aquinas,	or	Descartes’	on	Spinoza,	or	Carnap’s	on	Quine,	we	conduct	this	type	of	research.	Often	the	causal	influence	is	acknowledged	by	the	later	thinker,	but	sometimes	its	extent	is	unclear	prior	to	close	analysis.			 Rarer	in	current	historiography	of	philosophy	is	research	into	processes	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	Nonetheless,	we	target	such	processes	when	we	study	the	evolution	of	broadly	Scholastic	metaphysics	from	Aquinas	in	the	13th	to	Suarez	in	the	16th	century	(see,	e.g.,	Robert	Pasnau’s	Metaphysical	Themes:	1274-1671);	the	
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evolution	of	German	Idealism	from	Kant	to	Hegel	(see,	e.g.,	Terry	Pinkard’s	German	
Philosophy	1760-1860);	or	of	analytic	philosophy	from	Frege,	Moore,	and	Russell	to	Quine,	Davidson,	and	beyond	(see,	e.g.,	Scott	Soames’	The	Analytic	Tradition	in	
Philosophy).			 In	contrast,	research	focused	on	the	search	for	“laws	of	history	of	philosophy”	–	whereby	lawlike	causal	patterns	governing	the	formation	of	new	philosophical	ideas	recurring	across	different	segments	of	the	history	of	philosophy	–	is	essentially	nonexistent	nowadays.	Ditto,	of	course,	for	an	explicitly	articulated	total	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	(whereby	a	certain	unity	of	“sense”	is	sought,	perhaps	encapsulating	a	directionality).	This	type	of	research	has	vanished	from	the	historiography	of	philosophy	just	as	much	as	it	has	from	general	historiography.	It	is	an	open	question	whether	this	reflects	a	metaphysical	conviction	that	history	has	no	laws	and	no	unity;	a	more	epistemological	suspicion	that	even	if	there	were	such	laws	or	such	unity,	we	simply	could	not,	with	the	evidence	at	our	disposal,	hope	to	pin	down	with	any	accuracy	or	precision	anything	resembling	a	general	law;	or	just	the	kind	of	institutional	pressure	toward	ever	increasing	specialization	that	characterizes	just	as	much	astrophysics	and	neurobiology,	say.		In	any	case,	it	is	worth	noting	that	although	contemporary	historiography	of	philosophy	does	not	feature	research	into	recurrent	patterns	or	laws	of	history,	much	less	into	a	putative	overarching	unity	or	direction	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	nor	does	any	work	by	historians	of	philosophy	suggest	a	refutation	of	the	ideas	lawlike	patterns	or	overarching	unity.	There	is	not	even	an	explicit	statement	denying	the	fruitfulness	of	any	research	on	such	questions.	The	whole	question	is	just	completely	off	the	radar	in	contemporary	historiography	of	philosophy.	In	the	absence	of	any	considerations	for	or	against	the	questions	of	historical	laws	or	overarching	unity,	we	may	grant	ourselves	permission,	I	propose,	to	dabble	in	disciplined	speculation	on	these	matters.			 We	may	think	of	this	part	of	the	historiography	of	philosophy	as	needing	to	make	an	initial	determination	as	to	the	relative	plausibility	of	three	positions:	[Skepticism]		 There	are	no	historical	laws,	much	less	an	underlying	unity,	to	be	found	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	[Optimism]		 There	is	no	underlying	unity	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	but	there	are	recurrent	laws	we	can	identify	and	formulate.	[Exuberance]		There	are	laws	governing	historical	evolution	of	philosophical	ideas,	and	a	certain	underlying	unity	they	embody	or	exemplify.		
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Optimists	may	then	divide	depending	on	the	kinds	of	historical	laws	they	hypothesize,	and	the	exuberant	must	come	down	on	a	particular	account	of	the	overarching	unity	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	In	the	next	section,	we	take	a	look	at	what	is	to	my	knowledge	the	most	recent	exuberant	account	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	developed	by	Franz	Brentano	(he	of	“intentionality	as	the	mark	of	the	mental”)	in	the	last	decade	of	the	19th	century.	It	might	be	useful,	I	am	thinking,	to	see	how	this	sort	of	thing	might	look.		 	3.	A	Case	Study	It	is	not	part	of	Brentano’s	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	that	it	tends	toward	an	endpoint.	There	is	no	direction	of	history	here	in	the	way	Hegel	and	Marx	claimed	for	human	history	in	general.	Moreover,	for	Brentano	there	is	no	linear	progression	in	the	history	of	philosophy	of	the	sort	we	may	observe	in	the	history	of	the	exact	and	natural	sciences.	Rather	the	history	of	philosophy	resembles	more	art	history,	where	phases	of	great	creativity	generating	genuine	value	are	followed	by	successive	phases	of	decline.		In	particular,	claims	Brentano,	there	are	four	phases	of	philosophical	developments	that	repeat	themselves	in	every	era	of	philosophy.	The	first	phase	is	the	one	that	generates	great	philosophical	value	and	carries	the	torch	of	philosophical	progress.	It	is	marked	by	two	main	characteristics:	a	purely	theoretical	impulse,	grounded	in	true	wonder	at	the	world,	and	a	naturalistic	method	that	adapts	itself	to	its	subject	matter.	This	first	phase	is	then	followed	by	three	successive	phases	of	ever	grosser	decline.	In	the	second	phase,	a	practical	mindset	substitutes	the	spirit	of	theoretical	wonder,	and	in	consequence,	the	applied	methodology	becomes	looser	and	more	approximative.	This	leads	inevitably,	thinks	Brentano,	to	loss	of	faith	in	the	advancement	of	philosophical	understanding,	and	ultimately	ushers	in	a	third	phase,	characterized	by	skepticism.	However,	because	such	skepticism	can	never	quench	our	inherent	thirst	for	knowledge	and	understanding,	it	is	soon	replaced	by	a	kind	of	mysterian	or	mystical	inclination	characterized	by	facile	and	unprincipled	belief	formation.	In	this	fourth	phase	we	linger	until	a	new	era	of	philosophy	begins,	studded	with	creative	innovations	fueled	by	purely	theoretical	interest	and	oiled	by	sound	methodology.		Brentano’s	case	for	this	recurring	pattern	is	brief	and	consists	in	claiming	a	natural	placing	of	some	prominent	figures	in	the	history	of	philosophy	in	each	phase	of	each	era.	The	scheme	is	displayed	in	Table	1.		
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	 theoretical	
phase	
practical		
phase	
skeptical		
phase	
mysterian	
phase	
Ancient	Philosophy	 Anaxagoras	to	Aristotle	 Stoicism	and	Epicureanism	 Pyrrhonian	Skepticism		 Neoplatonism	
Medieval	Philosophy	 Aquinas	(and	Dominicans)	 Scotus	(and	Franciscans)	 Ockham	(and	nominalists)	 Eckhart,	Cusanus,	etc.	
Modern		Philosophy	 Francis	Bacon	and	Descartes	 The	Enlightenment	 Hume	 Reid,	Kant,	and	the	Idealists		
Table	1.	Brentano’s	Interpretation	of	the	History	of	Philosophy		The	scheme	naturally	places	Brentano’s	philosophical	heroes	–	Aristotle,	Aquinas,	and	Descartes	–	in	the	first,	ascendant	phases,	and	associates	his	nemeses	Kant	and	Hegel	with	mystics	such	as	Meister	Eckhart.	It	also	has	the	fortuitous	if	somewhat	megalomaniac	implication	that	with	Brentano	himself	a	fourth	era	of	philosophical	rejuvenation	is	about	to	start.	But	setting	aside	these	problematic	features,	Brentano’s	scheme,	if	accepted,	would	have	the	great	virtue	of	imposing	a	clear	organization	on	the	history	of	philosophy	in	toto,	thus	making	sense	of	it.	Instead	of	a	long	list	of	prominent	thinkers,	we	would	get	a	highly	structured	narrative.		In	particular,	Brentano’s	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	clearly	provides	us	with	laws	of	historical	development.	We	can	think	of	such	statements	as	“a	skeptical	phase	leads	to	a	mysterian	phase”	as	capturing	a	basic	kind	of	law.	In	addition,	however,	we	can	see	the	statement	“each	era	is	characterized	by	the	same	progression	through	four	phases”	as	a	sort	of	supreme	historical	law,	the	law	that	captures,	in	a	way,	the	deep	uniformity	in	the	history	of	philosophy.		One	may	quibble	of	course	with	the	specifics	of	Brentano’s	theory.	Why	and	how	did	Aquinas	get	to	be	the	first	Medieval	philosopher,	wondered	Étienne	Gilson,	perhaps	the	greatest	medievalist	of	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century	–	do	we	not	have	over	half	a	millennium	of	medieval	philosophical	reflection	before	him?	Likewise,	we	may	wonder	whether	Reid	is	really	a	mysterian.	Brentano	treats	him	so	because	Reid	grounds	all	knowledge	in	otherwise	ungrounded	“commonsense	beliefs.”	This	seems	a	bit	thin	as	a	reason	to	lump	Reid	together	with	the	likes	of	Plotinus	and	Hegel.	In	fact,	the	attachment	to	common	sense	seems,	in	temperament	at	least,	all	the	opposite	of	the	allure	of	mystical	flights.	More	deeply,	I	find	it	more	than	a	little	suspicious	that	the	organization	of	chronologies	into	cycles	featuring	the	battle	of	good	versus	evil,	with	eventual	rebirth	of	the	good	to	launch	a	new	cycle	–	this	abstract	and	somewhat	cartoonish	pattern	–,	is	
 7 
such	a	recurring	theme	in	many	traditions’	quasi-mythological	histories.	Even	the	number	four	seems	to	come	up	time	and	again	in	these	systems,	for	instance	in	Hindu	and	Zoroastrian	conceptions	of	history.	Might	there	not	be	something	about	our	cognitive	hardwiring	that	pushes	us	to	impose	cyclical-cum-tetralogical	order	on	the	phenomena,	instead	of	it	being	the	phenomena	themselves	that	recommend	these	four-phase	cycles?		In	addition,	one	may	also	raise	an	eyebrow	about	Brentano’s	dogmatic	acceptance	of	the	standard	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy	in	terms	of	Ancient,	Medieval,	and	Modern	eras.	This	periodization	leaves	much	to	be	desired,	as	we	will	now	discuss.			4.	Periodization		Perhaps	the	most	elementary	way	to	impose	initial	structure	on	an	otherwise	unstructured	list	of	events	is	through	periodization:	segmenting	the	list	into	more	or	less	self-contained	sub-lists.	Although	in	itself	a	merely	temporal	specification,	the	choice	of	periodization	reflects	a	certain	conception	of	the	causal	coherence	internal	to	each	period,	with	passage	to	a	new	period	indicating	a	break	in	normal	processes	of	development.	To	that	extent,	the	periodization	we	adopt	of	any	history	betrays	a	commitment	to	a	bird’s	eye	view	analysis	of	the	major	streaks	in	that	history.	The	most	standard	periodization	of	human	history,	the	one	we	all	learned	at	school,	starts	history	with	the	advent	of	historical	records	(dismissing	everything	prior	to	that	as	“pre-history”)	and	dividing	history	into	three	main	periods:	the	Ancient	world,	going	roughly	from	the	founding	of	Rome	in	the	mid-8th	century	BCE	to	its	collapse	at	the	end	of	the	5th	century	CE;	the	Middle	Ages,	spanning	roughly	500-1500;	and	Modernity,	from	“the	age	of	discovery”	circa	1500	to	the	present.	Wherefrom	came	to	our	schools	this	particular	periodization?	The	answer	is	not	entirely	clear.	Early	Renaissance	thinkers,	notably	Petrarch	and	Leonardo	Bruni,	have	already	divided	Western	history	into	three	important	segments,	in	which	the	dark	Middle	Ages	interrupted	the	intellectual	and	cultural	growth	of	ideas	in	the	Ancient	Greco-Roman	world,	to	be	reborn,	so	to	speak,	with	the	Renaissance.	This	periodization	was	popularized	in	the	17th	century	by	the	German	historian	Christoph	Keller	(a.k.a.	Cellarius).	But	the	model	became	entrenched,	and	enriched	with	the	concept	of	“prehistory,”	primarily	through	the	German	Enlightenment;	the	works	of	August	Ludwig	von	Schlözer	on	“universal	history”	in	the	final	third	of	the	18th	century	are	representative	here.		
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As	we	know,	the	standard	periodization	of	the	history	of	(Western)	philosophy,	inscribed	in	the	academic	curriculum,	is	essentially	the	same:	we	have	(1)	Ancient	Philosophy,	going	from	Thales	in	the	7th	century	BCE	to	circa	500;	(2)	Medieval	Philosophy,	going	basically	from	500	to	1600;	and	(3)	Modern	Philosophy,	starting	with	Descartes	in	the	early	17th	century	and	still	ongoing.	Each	of	these	mega-periods	also	admits	of	a	more	or	less	standard	sub-periodization	in	the	curriculum.	Thus	we	divide	Ancient	Philosophy	into	(1.1)	the	Pre-Socratics	(7th	–	5th	BCE),	(1.2)	Socrates,	Plato,	and	Aristotle,	(1.3)	Hellenistic	philosophy	(4th	BCE	–	3rd	CE),	and	(1.4)	Late	Antiquity	(3rd	–	6th	CE);	Medieval	Philosophy	into	(2.1)	the	Early	Middle	Ages	(6th	–	10th	CE),	(2.2)	the	High	Middle	Ages	(11th	–	13th),	and,	sometimes	but	not	always	set	apart,	(2.3)	Renaissance	Philosophy	(14th	–	16th);	while	Modern	Philosophy	we	divide	into	(3.1)	Early	Modern	(17th	-18th,	Descartes	to	Kant),	(3.2)	19th-century	philosophy,	and	(3.3)	20th	century	to	the	present	(starting	with	Frege,	Moore,	and	Russell	for	analytic	philosophy,	Husserl	for	phenomenology).		A	curious	feature	of	this	standard	periodization	is	that	it	is	entirely	derivative	from	the	periodization	of	human	history	in	general	–	it	takes	into	account	exactly	nothing	specific	to	the	development	of	philosophical	ideas.	This	is	in	truth	very	odd.	Is	there	really	a	reason	we	should	expect	philosophical	turning	points	to	align	so	perfectly	with	turning	points	in	the	history	of	humanity	more	generally?	Perhaps	there	is	such	a	reason,	say,	as	far	as	political	philosophy	is	concerned.	But	when	it	comes	to	metaphysics,	say,	it	would	be	very	surprising	if	the	rise	and	fall	of	Rome	should	coincide	with	the	rise	and	fall	of	abstracta,	or	if	the	“age	of	discovery”	that	ushered	in	Modernity	happened	to	coincide	with	the	rise	of	idealism.	At	any	rate,	even	if	major	events	in	human	history	did	trigger	important	philosophical	developments,	why	should	the	absence	of	major	historical	events	encourage	the	absence	of	important	philosophical	developments?	We	might,	on	the	contrary,	expect	long-term	stability	to	provide	the	foundations	for	contemplative	progress;	or	we	might	expect	individual	genius	to	show	up	in	complete	independence	of	historical	context.	As	soon	as	we	take	critical	distance	from	this	standard	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	its	flaws	become	instantly	evident.	I	will	name	only	two.		Arguably,	the	most	important,	most	decisive	century	in	the	whole	of	(Western)	philosophy	is	that	from	Plato’s	birth	to	Aristotle’s	death.	Whitehead	famously	said	that	the	philosophical	tradition	consists	in	a	series	of	footnotes	to	Plato.	As	I	will	later	suggest,	Whitehead	was	half	right	and	very	wrong:	it	would	be	more	accurate	to	say	that	half	the	philosophical	tradition	consists	in	footnotes	to	(i.e.,	elaborations	of)	Plato;	the	other	half	consists	in	footnotes	to/elaborations	of	Aristotle.	Yet	this	pivotal	sub-period	occurs	in	the	middle	of	the	standard	period	we	call	Ancient	Philosophy.	In	a	
 9 
proper	periodization,	I	suggest,	that	fateful	century	would	launch	a	new	stage	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	This	is	an	instance	where	a	crucial	juncture	in	the	history	of	philosophy	corresponds	to	no	pivotal	event	in	the	larger	history	of	human	affairs.		Secondly	(and	conversely),	when	we	look	for	a	major	philosophical	turning	point	to	accompany	the	fall	of	Rome	in	476,	and	to	signal	a	transition	from	the	first	to	the	second	great	supposed	periods	of	Western	philosophy,	we	come	up	blank.	The	best	candidate	is	surely	Boethius’	Consolation	of	Philosophy,	as	well	as	his	earlier	commentaries	on	Aristotle	and	Porphyry.	But	although	Boethius	was	very	influential	in	the	Middle	Ages,	he	is	generally	regarded	as	a	relatively	derivative	thinker,	mostly	combining	and	modifying	familiar	Aristotelian,	Neoplatonist,	and	Christian	ideas.	And	it	is	noteworthy	that	most	philosophy	graduates	today	earn	their	B.A.	without	ever	hearing	of	Boethius	in	the	classroom	–	or	indeed	outside	it.	Clearly,	then,	we	do	not	in	fact	designate	Boethius	as	a	crucial	figure	marking	a	turning	point	in	the	history	of	philosophy.		To	be	clear,	I	am	personally	a	big	fan	of	Boethius,	whom	I	take	to	have	a	strong	claim	to	being	the	first	(Western)	nominalist.	But	my	point	is	once	removed	from	the	first-order	question	of	the	merit	in	Boethius’	philosophical	ideas.	The	question	I	am	raising	is	rather	this:	since	we	do	not	in	fact	take	Boethius	to	represent	anything	like	the	kind	of	turning	point	in	the	history	of	philosophy	that	we	take	the	fall	of	the	Roman	Empire	to	be	in	Western	history,	why	do	we	align	the	periodization	of	the	history	philosophy	with	that	of	the	history	of	human	affairs	writ	large?	This	alignment	seems	in	truth	entirely	artificial.	Why,	then,	do	we	cut	up	the	history	of	philosophy	the	way	we	do?	One	line	of	thought	is	that	any	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy	is	bound	to	be	arbitrary	to	some	extent,	so	we	might	as	well	adopt	an	otherwise	familiar	framework	for	cutting	it	up.	Now,	in	this	form,	the	claim	seems	to	me	a	tad	too	strong	–	surely	some	putative	periodizations	are	better	than	others.	Nonetheless,	it	is	quite	likely	that	a	multiplicity	of	possible	periodizations	would	prove	equally	good,	at	least	from	certain	perspectives,	and	anyway	there	are	probably	no	“facts	of	the	matter”	about	the	correct	periodization.	However,	this	point	by	itself	does	not	quite	justify	uncritical	acceptance	of	the	standard	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy.	In	fact,	it	encourages	the	floating	of	alternative	periodizations	and	their	comparison	with	the	standard	one	and	with	one	another.			 II. The	Parallel-Streams	Theory	
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	5.	Two	Philosophical	Temperaments	In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	I	want	to	sketch	the	kind	of	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	that	I	find	most	initially	appealing.	Indeed	I	take	this	to	be	the	most	banal	and	undaring	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	one	might	come	up	with.	Its	main	virtue	is	just	in	being	a	theory	–	a	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	as	a	whole.			 I	will	start	by	sketching	a	portrait	of	two	opposing	philosophical	temperaments.	I	will	call	them	Temperament	A	and	Temperament	B	to	avoid	any	baggage	that	might	come	with	more	illuminating	labels,	though	one	would	not	be	too	far	off	the	mark	if	instead	one	called	them	the	Platonist	and	Aristotelian	temperaments.	I	will	then	sketch	a	way	to	model	the	development	of	philosophical	ideas	in	terms	of	the	interaction	of	three	forces	feeding	into	individual	thinkers’	work,	resulting	in	the	parallel	development	toward	the	self-articulation,	if	you	will,	of	a	stable,	maximally	plausible	A-type	worldview	and	a	stable,	maximally	plausible	B-type	worldview.			 My	portrait	of	the	two	temperaments,	in	Table	2,	is	in	the	style	of	caricature.	I	imagine	that	a	single	philosopher	embodies	all	A-type	temperamental	characteristics	and	another	embodies	all	B-type	characteristics.	In	practice,	the	vast	majority	of	philosophers	are	thankfully	more	complex	intellectual	personalities.	But	caricature	has	its	expository	virtues.		
	 Temperament	A	 Temperament	B	in	metaphysics,	 a	welcoming	attitude	toward	all	manners	of	abstracta	and	universals,	seen	not	just	as	necessary	concessions	but	as	agreeable	liberators	from	the	dreariness	of	concrete	reality;	
a	marked	preference	for	nominalism	and	desert	landscapes,	not	just	as	outputs	of	fair-minded	evaluation	of	arguments	but	as	a	precondition	for	a	serious	attempt	to	make	sense	of	the	world;	in	(the	part	of	metaphysics	we	now	call)	philosophy	of	mind,	
an	anti-materialist	instinct	that	spans	the	gamut	of	dualism,	idealism,	and	other	ways	of	recognizing	something	other	than	brute	matter	among	the	ungrounded	grounds	of	reality;	
a	strong	attachment	to		materialism	(or	“	physicalism”	in	the	newfangled	jargon);	
in	epistemology,	 a	tendency	toward	rationalism	and	intuitionism,	with	a	faith	in	a	 an	empiricist	inclination	to	base	all	knowledge	on	observational	
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Table	2.	Caricature	of	Two	Basic	Philosophical	Temperaments		A	very	similar	opposition	is	proposed,	incidentally,	by	William	James	in	Chap.	1	of	
Pragmatism.	James	distinguishes	between	“two	kinds	of	philosopher,”	one	of	whom	he	calls	tender-minded	and	characterizes	as	“Rationalistic	(going		by	‘principles’),	Intellectualistic,	Idealistic,	Optimistic,	Religious,	Free-Willist,	Monistic,	Dogmatical”;	the	other	he	calls	tough-minded	and	characterizes	as	“Empiricist	(going	by	‘facts’),	Sensationalistic,	Materialistic,	Pessimistic,	Irreligious,	Pluralistic,	Sceptical.”	I	bracket	for	present	purposes	the	question	of	whether	James’	is	in	fact	the	same	distinction,	but	with	differences	of	emphasis	due	to	different	philosophical	climate,	or	a	similar	but	
priori	principles	as	epistemic	foundations	from	which	the	rest	of	our	knowledge	is	deductively	inferred;	
encounter	with	particular	facts	–	dated	and	localized	occurrences	–	and	inductive	rather	than	deductive	inference	from	them;	in	moral	philosophy,	 a	rationalist	approach	that	seeks	to	derive	commonly	accepted	moral	precepts	from	a	priori	moral	principles;	
a	more	sentimentalist	attempt	to	ground	moral	understanding	in	concrete	emotional	experience	rather	than	pure	reason;	in	philosophical	methodology,	 a	willingness	to	accept	mysterian	and	sometimes	even	mystical	elements	in	a	complete	picture	of	the	world	(footnote:	for	religious	philosophers,	enter	credo	quia	
absurdum	etc.);	
a	naturalism	that	puts	a	premium	on	explanations	that	appeal	only	to	posits	internal	to	the	spatiotemporal	realm	(footnote:	for	religious	philosophers,	substitute	rational	theism);	in	meta-philosophical	sensibility,	 a	tireless	monism	convinced	that	the	plurality	in	appearance	must	belie	an	ultimate	unity	in	noumenal	reality,	and	indeed	that	reality	only	becomes	fully	intelligible	when	this	unity	is	uncovered;	
a	skeptical	attitude	toward	the	monistic	drive	and	a	greater	trust	in	pluralistic	accounts	that	resist	forcing	unity	on	the	phenomena;	
in	philosophical	prose,	 an	emphasis	on	the	literary	and	Humanistic	qualities	of	presentation	and	an	acknowledgement	of	the	role	of	rhetoric	in	communicating	ideas.	
a	dry	and	literal	style	that	prizes	clarity	and	precision	above	all	and	takes	as	its	model	science	writing	rather	than	literature.	
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slightly	different	distinction.	I	just	mean	to	signal	a	certain	precedent	to	the	distinction	I	draw	between	Temperaments	A	and	B.			 As	noted,	it	is	natural	to	see	Plato	and	Aristotle	as	prototypes	of	type-A	and	type-B	philosophers.	(Here	I	use	“prototype”	in	the	industrial	sense	of	the	term,	so	to	speak;	in	the	sense	in	which	it	is	used	in	the	cognitive	psychology	of	concepts,	to	mean	something	like	paradigm,	the	honors	may	go	rather	to	Plotinus	and	Hume.)	Plato’s	well-known	metaphysics	of	a-spatial	and	a-temporal	Forms	as	what	is	most	real,	his	idealism	and	arguments	for	the	incorporeality	and	immortality	of	the	soul,	as	well	as	his	account	of	knowledge	as	innate	and	only	recalled	(rather	than	acquired)	with	the	aid	of	sense	perception	–	all	present	already	in	the	Phaedo	–	testify	to	his	A	temperament;	and	of	course	Plato’s	dialogues	afford	some	of	the	greatest	literary	delights	of	all	philosophical	prose.	Meanwhile,	Aristotle’s	focus	on	the	metaphysics	of	material	objects	and	his	understanding	of	in	re	universals	as	enclosed	within	spacetime,	his	integrated	hylomorphist	account	of	the	mind-body	relationship,	his	straightforward	empiricist	statement,	in	De	Anima	III,	that	“if	we	did	not	perceive	anything,	we	would	not	learn	or	understand	anything,”	and	his	appreciation	for	the	variety	and	multiplicity	of	phenomena,	perhaps	most	evident	in	his	biological	works,	all	stand	in	testimony	to	his	B	temperament;	but	no	reader	of	the	Metaphysics	would	accuse	its	author	of	excess	lyricism,	however	awestruck	we	might	be	by	his	sheer	brainpower.		6.	Two	Parallel	Streams	It	is	useful	for	my	proposed	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	that	Plato	and	Aristotle	fit	the	A	and	B	molds	so	well,	because	for	almost	two	millennia	following	them,	the	history	of	philosophy	was	almost	self-consciously	the	result	of	the	ongoing	competitive	juxtaposition	of	a	Platonist	and	an	Aristotelian	worldview,	modulo	the	occasional	dismissal	of	both	as	relics	of	dangerous	paganism	or	their	attempted	synthesis	into	a	single	worldview	of	“the	philosopher.”	All	the	way	up	to	the	Renaissance	we	find	philosophers	time	and	again	designating	themselves	as	Platonist	or	Aristotelian,	or	dedicating	themselves	to	commentary	or	analysis	of	Platonic	and/or	Aristotelian	texts.	From	my	perspective,	though,	it	is	not	Plato	and	Aristotle	themselves	that	define	the	subsequent	unfolding	of	the	history	of	philosophy.	Rather,	they	play	the	special	roles	they	do	only	because	they	happen	to	offer	early	and	near-perfect	embodiments	of	Temperaments	A	and	B.		Insofar	as	two	thousand	years	of	(Western)	philosophy	self-consciously	lend	themselves	to	modeling	in	terms	of	a	competitive	juxtaposition	of	early	embodiments	
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of	Temperament	A	and	Temperament	B,	a	model	of	the	entire	history	of	philosophy	as	organized	around	the	parallel	development	and	self-articulation	of	these	two	philosophical	temperaments	carries	initial	plausibility.	It	is	mostly	the	extension	of	the	model	into	Modern	Philosophy	that	requires	an	element	of	“creativity”	on	the	theory’s	part.	But	in	truth	the	commonplace	division	of	Modern	philosophers	into	rationalists	and	empiricists	maps	relatively	neatly	onto	Temperaments	A	and	B	as	well	(hence	James’	division	of	philosophers	into	Rationalist	lovers	of	principles	and	Empiricist	lovers	of	facts).	My	own	view	is	that	the	standard	classification	of	Descartes	as	a	rationalist	is	something	of	a	historiographical	blunder,	but	bracketing	the	case	of	Descartes,	it	is	not	hard	to	appreciate	how	Spinoza,	Kant,	and	19th-century	German	and	British	Idealists	partake	in	Temperament	A,	or	how	Temperament	B	is	exemplified	by	the	British	Empiricists,	19th-century	continental	positivists	like	Auguste	Comte	and	Ernst	Mach,	as	well	as	Brentano	and	some	of	his	followers,	notably	the	“Polish	logicians	and	nominalists,”	as	Ernest	Nagel	called	them	in	what	is	probably	the	first	self-conscious	use	of	the	expression	“analytic	philosophy”	–	Nagel’s	1936	paper	“Impressions	and	Appraisals	of	Analytic	Philosophy	in	Europe.”	With	these	remarks	in	place,	let	me	now	provide	a	sketch	of	two	parallel	streams	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	an	A-	and	a	B-stream.	I	issue	a	series	of	caveats	immediately	thereafter.		
• Plato	
• Speusippus,	Xenocrates,	and	the	Old	Academy	
• Philo	of	Alexandria,	Plutarch,	and	the	other	Middle	Platonists	
• Plotinus	
• Porphyry,	Augustine,	Boethius,	and	other	Neoplatonists				
• Anselm,	Bonaventure		
• Marsilio	Ficino,	Cusanus,	and	other	Renaissance	Humanists	
• Descartes	and	Spinoza	
• Cudworth	and	the	Cambridge	Platonists	
• Kant	
• Fichte,	Schelling,	Hegel	and	other	
• Aristotle	
• Peripatetics	from	Theophrastus	through	Alexander	of	Aphrodisias	to	Andronicus				
• Boethius		
• Al-Farabi,	Averroes,	Maimonides,	and	later	Averroists		
• Aquinas,	Ockham,	and	most	late	Scholastics			
• Suárez,	Francis	Bacon	
• Descartes	
• From	Locke	through	Hume	to	Mill:	three	centuries	of	British	Empiricism	
• Comte	and	Mach	(early	
 14 
German	as	well	as	British	Idealists		
• G.	E.	Moore,	neo-Kantians			
 
positivism)		
• Brentano	and	most	parts	of	the	Brentano	School	
• The	Vienna	Circle	and	Quine	
 Now	to	the	caveats.	First,	note	that	the	two	streams	are	not	exclusive.	I	have	included	Boethius	and	Descartes	in	both,	because	each	seems	to	me	to	have	initiated	philosophical	developments	of	the	first	significance	within	both	streams.	(I	bracket	here	my	reasons	for	saying	this;	the	point	is	just	that	there	is	nothing	inherently	problematic	in	the	notion	of	such	dual	contribution.)	Secondly,	my	two	streams	are	not	exhaustive	either:	I	am	not	sure,	for	instance,	where	if	anywhere	to	place	the	Hellenistic	schools,	Leibniz,	American	Pragmatism,	Husserl,	or	Wittgenstein.	(The	problem	may	be	just	epistemic,	insofar	as	more	sustained	analysis	would	issue	in	
some	recommendation;	but	there	may	also	be	no	fact	of	the	matter	about	such	things.)	Thirdly,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind,	in	any	case,	that	most	philosophers	fit	neither	caricature	very	closely,	and	I	am	assigning	them	to	one	stream	rather	than	another	mostly	because	they	resemble	one	caricature	more	than	they	do	the	other.	Fourthly,	obviously	the	choice	of	who	to	include	on	these	lists	reflects	a	certain	view	about	who	the	important	figures	are	in	each	era.	Here	I	have	not	exercised	any	personal	judgment	but	have	simply	placed	canonical	figures	on	the	list.	But	a	proper	development	of	a	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	should	exercise	judgment.	Finally,	and	most	importantly,	it	is	perfectly	possible	to	disagree	about	the	proper	classification	of	some	of	these	thinkers.	I	can	see	the	case,	for	instance,	for	denying	Boethius	a	place	in	the	B-stream,	or	according	Al-Farabi	a	subsidiary	assignment	in	the	A-stream.	However,	to	quarrel	about	the	proper	assignment	of	this	or	that	figure	in	stream	A	or	B	is	not	itself	to	question	the	usefulness	of	organizing	the	history	of	philosophy	along	these	two	streams.	As	a	tool	for	imposing	structure	on	what	is	otherwise	a	brute	chronology	of	philosophy,	the	division	of	the	history	of	philosophy	into	developments	in	Temperament	A’s	self-articulation	and	Temperament	B’s	self-articulation	may	prove	illuminating	–	that	is,	it	may	help	us	see	real	order	and	real	patterns	in	the	history	of	philosophy	–	even	if	it	is	not	always	immediately	clear	where	an	individual	philosopher	is	best	placed	within	this	superstructure.			 Is	there	a	direction	to	the	history	of	philosophy,	if	this	is	how	we	think	of	it?	There	certainly	need	not	be,	and	perhaps	owing	to	my	own	B-ish	temperament,	I	am	disinclined	to	think	of	history,	philosophical	or	otherwise,	in	teleological	terms.	(I	am	with	Ranke	and	Herzen	against	Hegel	and	Marx	on	this!)	Nonetheless,	it	is	certainly	possible	to	imagine	two	natural	“resting	points”	for	the	history	of	philosophy	as	modeled	here.	The	first	is	the	convergence	on	something	resembling	
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long-term	consensus	on	what	the	stablest	and	most	ultima	facie	plausible	philosophical	package	deals	are	tailored	to	A-type	antecedent	sensibilities	and	B-type	sensibilities.	The	second	is	the	fashioning	of	the	stablest	and	most	ultima	facie	plausible	synthesis	of	the	two	outlooks.			 As	duly	promised,	the	above	is	almost	banal	as	a	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy.	Much	of	it	is	generated	by	stitching	together	two	dividing	lines	familiar	from	standard	historiography	of	philosophy	–	the	Platonist/Aristotelian	line	for	Ancient	and	Medieval	philosophy	and	the	rationalist/empiricist	line	for	Modern	philosophy	–	to	reconstruct	two	more	or	less	continuous	streams	of	unfolding	philosophical	developments.	The	distinctive	claim	here	is	mostly	just	that	the	underlying	rationale	for	this	organization	has	to	do	with	a	dichotomy	between	two	opposing	philosophical	temperaments,	namely,	those	caricatured	above.			7.	Mechanics	of	Progression	Given	an	organization	of	the	history	of	philosophy	along	two	parallel	streams,	how	are	we	to	understand	the	evolution	of	ideas	within	each	stream?	My	suggestion	is	that	an	individual	thinker’s	philosophical	ideas	are	the	resultants	of	three	forces.	The	first	is	the	influence	of	earlier	thinkers	of	similar	temperament.	The	second	is	
counter-influence,	so	to	speak,	by	challenges	the	thinker	perceives	as	emerging	from	the	opposing	philosophical	temperament.	The	third	is	the	thinker’s	own	intellectual	impetus,	imparting	on	his	or	her	work	the	distinctive	and	unpredictable	quality	that	makes	the	history	of	philosophy	such	a	“live”	process.		 Different	thinkers	will	exhibit	different	admixtures	of	these	three	forces	in	their	philosophical	“output.”	On	the	whole,	we	seem	to	designate	as	key	figures	in	the	history	of	philosophy	those	we	take	to	(i)	have	a	larger	than	usual	portion	of	personal	impetus	in	the	formation	of	their	ideas	and	(ii)	exercise	a	larger	than	usual	influence	and/or	counter-influence	on	subsequent	thinkers.	Philosophers	we	take	to	exhibit	(i)	but	not	(ii),	or	(ii)	but	not	(i),	tend	to	sit	on	the	cusp	of	our	pantheon	–	they	are	objects	of	intense	scholarship	but	do	not	typically	show	up	in	the	undergraduate	curriculum	(Brentano	may	fit	the	first	profile,	Averroes	the	second).			 Among	the	philosophers	we	take	to	exhibit	both	(i)	and	(ii)	–	that	is,	high-impetus	philosophers	exercising	considerable	influence	and	counter-influence	–	certain	further	distinctions	may	be	made.	In	particular,	we	might	distinguish	three	profiles:	(a)	those	thinkers	who	are	themselves	susceptible	primarily	to	counter-influence	(e.g.,	Kant,	slumber-woken	as	he	is	by	Hume),	(b)	those	more	susceptible	
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to	straightforward	influence	(e.g.,	Aquinas,	drawing	primarily	on	Aristotle),	and	(c)	those	appearing	to	form	their	philosophical	ideas	almost	entirely	from	internal	impetus	(Descartes?).	Here,	too,	of	course,	caricatures	are	useful	in	bringing	out	more	sharply	what	in	reality	are	much	blurrier	affairs.			 Within	the	framework	I	am	proposing,	a	history	of	(Western)	philosophy	would	trace	the	development	of	ideas	as	a	function	of	the	forces	of	influence,	counter-influence,	and	impetus	swirling	in	each	stream,	the	A	stream	originating	in	Plato	and	the	B	stream	originating	in	Aristotle.	Those	streams	develop	at	some	periods	in	relative	isolation	from	each	other,	at	others	through	intense	cross-fertilization	or	even	partial	merging,	but	most	of	the	time	somewhere	in-between.	It	is	very	unusual,	though,	for	developments	in	one	stream	to	be	comprehensible	without	any	reference	to	preceding	and	roughly	contemporaneous	developments	in	the	other.	Full	appreciation	of	the	one	is	thus	likely	to	require	substantial	appreciation	of	the	other.	Still,	we	may	legitimately	view	each	stream	as	seeking	primarily	its	most	plausible	self-articulation	given	the	challenges	posed	by	the	other	stream.	What	kind	of	historical	laws,	if	any,	should	we	expect	in	a	parallel-stream	model	of	the	history	of	philosophy?	We	might	hope	to	find,	at	a	suitable	level	of	descriptive	abstraction,	certain	recurring	patterns	in	the	way	individual	philosophers	build	on	predecessors	to	develop	ever	purer	embodiments	of	one	philosophical	temperament;	here	the	mini-histories	of	Late	Scholasticism,	British	Empiricism,	and	German	Idealism	might	provide	fertile	material.	On	the	other	hand,	we	might	also	hope	to	discover	recurring	patterns	in	the	way	individual	philosophers	develop	breakthrough	ideas	in	reaction	to	challenges	they	perceive	from	thinkers	of	the	opposing	philosophical	temperament.	Here	we	might	think	paradigmatically	of	Aristotle’s	reaction	to	Plato,	Kant’s	reaction	to	Hume,	and	the	two	roughly	simultaneous	and	broadly	“analytic”	reactions	to	19th-century	idealism:	Moore	and	Russell’s	to	British	Idealism	and	Brentano’s	to	German	Idealism.	If	certain	abstract	regularities	can	be	found	across	these	cases,	they	might	serve	as	prima	facie	hypotheses	about	historical	laws.	These	would	be	putative	laws	
of	influence	and	putative	laws	of	counter-influence.	I	personally	suspect	there	are	not	also	“laws	of	impetus”	for	us	to	seek:	individuals’	idiosyncratic	intellectual	impetus	is	precisely	what	injects	into	the	history	of	philosophy	its	contingent,	accidental,	unpredictable	(in	a	word:	Dionysian)	dimension.		In	addition	to	such	laws	of	influence	and	counter-influence,	we	also	have	the	“supreme	law”	that	the	history	of	philosophy	progresses	in	two	parallel	streams,	in	which	the	stablest	and	most	ultima	facie	plausible	philosophical	package	deals	are	
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sought	that	would	articulate	Temperament	A’s	and	Temperament	B’s	antecedent	sensibilities.	This	is	our	counterpart	to	Brentano’s	law	that	each	era	in	the	history	of	philosophy	is	characterized	by	the	same	progression	through	four	phases.	It	is	what	captures	the	most	fundamental	structure	we	are	trying	to	impose	on	the	chronology	of	philosophy.			8.	Periodization	Again	I	want	to	close	with	some	remarks	on	how	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy	should	be	approached	within	the	parallel-streams	framework.	But	perhaps	the	most	important	upshot	of	the	framework	is	that	we	approach	the	history	of	philosophy	wrongly	when	we	slice	it	“horizontally,”	along	historical	periods,	and	expect	period-based	academic	specialization.	We	do	the	history	of	philosophy	greater	justice,	in	fact,	when	we	slice	it	“vertically,”	along	longitudinal	segments	of	the	two	parallel	streams	I	have	sketched,	and	encourage	specialization	in	the	evolution	of	ideas	across	time	within	either	stream.	This	kind	of	historian	of	philosophy	does	exist:	for	the	A-stream,	we	have	the	work	of	Raymond	Klibansky,	who	published	on	Plato,	Proclus	and	other	Neoplatonists,	the	reception	of	Platonic	ideas	in	Byzantine	and	Islamic	philosophy,	and	the	continuity	through	the	Middle	Ages	all	the	way	to	Cusanus	in	the	Renaissance	(see,	e.g.,	Klibansky	1939);	for	the	B-stream,	see	notably	the	work	of	Hamid	Taieb,	who	has	published	on	B-type	thinkers	from	Aristotle	and	Alexander	of	Aphrodisias	though	Aquinas	and	Peter	Auriol	to	Brentano	and	Twardowski,	inter	alia	(see,	e.g.,	Taieb	2018).	But	the	academic	norm	is	clearly	horizontal	rather	than	vertical	specialization.	This	makes	a	certain	amount	of	professional	sense.	Vertical	scholarship	obviously	requires	non-trivial	linguistic	and	historical	competencies.	Still,	as	noted	it	seems	to	me	to	do	greater	justice	to	the	internal	logic	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	and	is	more	likely	to	bring	us	nearer	a	correct	understanding	of	the	overall	history	of	philosophy.			 That	said,	it	is	an	independently	interesting	question	how	we	should	approach	the	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy	within	the	parallel-streams	framework.	Here	two	(entirely	compatible)	periodization	projects	suggest	themselves	to	me.		The	first	project	is	to	segment	each	stream	separately	into	its	own	distinctive	periods.	What	are	the	turning	points	in	Temperament	A’s	philosophical	self-articulation,	and	what	in	Temperament	B’s?	For	A,	we	might	for	instance	designate	Plato	to	Plotinus	as	the	first	era,	Plotinus	to	Kant	as	the	second	era,	and	post-Kantian	A-type	philosophy	as	the	era	we	are	still	in;	and	for	B,	we	might	take	Aristotle	to	
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Aquinas	as	the	first	era,	Aquinas	to	Bacon	as	the	second	era,	the	half-millennium	of	predominantly	Anglophone	empiricism	and	positivism	between	Bacon	and	Quine	as	a	third	era,	and	post-Quinean	B-type	philosophy	as	a	fourth	era	now	in	its	infancy	(see	Table	3).	I	am	proposing	this	periodization	mostly	for	the	sake	of	illustration.	But	there	are	several	general	points	it	serves	to	illustrate.	First	of	all,	the	philosophical	periodization	need	not	align	with	the	Schlözer-style	periodization	of	Western	history	into	Ancient,	Medieval,	and	Modern.	Secondly,	the	periodizations	of	the	A	stream	and	B	stream	need	not	align	with	each	other;	in	fact,	there	is	little	reason	to	expect	them	to.	Thirdly,	periods	can	vary	greatly	in	their	length	–	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	neat	roughly	millennium-long	periods	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	And	fourthly,	we	may	find	that	one	stream	naturally	segments	more	fine-grainedly	than	the	other;	again,	there	is	no	a	priori	reason	to	expect	anything	else.	
• Plato			
• Plotinus			 	 		
• Kant	
 
• Aristotle								
• Aquinas	
• Bacon		
• Quine		
Table	3.	A	Possible	Two-Stream	Periodization	of	the	History	of	Philosophy		 A	second	periodization	project	within	the	parallel-streams	framework	would	seek	to	segment	the	overall	history	of	(Western)	philosophy	by	the	relative	long-term	dominance	of	Temperament	A	or	Temperament	B	in	the	philosophical	landscape.	Three	types	of	possible	periods	might	be	distinguished:	when	Temperament	A	is	dominant,	when	Temperament	B	is	dominant,	and	when	neither	dominates.	Thus,	we	might	designate	the	period	between	Plato	and	Plotinus	as	a	first	era	of	no-dominance;	the	period	between	Plotinus	and	Averroes/Aquinas	as	a	second	era,	dominated	by	Temperament	A;	the	period	from	Aquinas	to	Spinoza	as	dominated	by	the	B	temperament;	and	thereafter	a	fourth	period	of	renewed	no-dominance.		
 19 
• Plato/Aristotle			
• Plotinus			 	
• Aquinas			
• Spinoza		
 
	No	dominance				A-dominance		B-dominance		No	dominance		
Table	4.	A	Possible	Single	Periodization		
	I	close	with	four	general	notes	on	these	two	periodization	projects.	First,	both	projects	invite	sub-periodizations	as	well.	Thus,	even	if	the	current,	fourth	stage	in	our	single	overall	periodization	is	characterized	by	no-dominance,	it	might	seem	natural	to	view	the	half	century	from	Descartes	to	Locke	as	A-accented,	the	following	century	–	from	Locke	to	Kant	–	as	B-accented,	and	the	following	century	as	A-accented	again.	It	is	just	with	a	coarser-grained	look	that	we	see	the	larger	period	as	more	balanced.		Second,	if	we	start	our	two	historical	streams	with	Plato	and	Aristotle,	we	are	effectively	confining	Socrates	and	his	predecessors	to	the	pre-history	of	philosophy,	somewhat	as	Schlözer	sent	pre-Roman	humanity	into	the	Dunkle	of	pre-history.	This	seems	to	me	in	truth	quite	justified,	if	only	because	we	have	essentially	no	written	material	from	these	thinkers,	only	quotations	and	testimonies	by	others	(much	of	what	we	know	about	the	pre-Socratics	comes	originally	from	Aristotle	and	Theophrastus,	and	almost	everything	we	know	about	Socrates’	philosophy	comes	from	Plato).		Third,	as	noted	I	do	not	expect	there	to	be	theory-independent	facts	of	the	matter	that	rationally	compel	us	to	accept	one	possible	periodization	over	all	others.	The	idea	of	‘natural	joints’	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	which	it	is	the	historian’s	aim	to	correctly	identify,	has	little	purchase	on	us	as	we	survey	the	mass	of	philosophical	works	that	constitute	the	history	of	philosophy.	This	raises	difficult	methodological	questions	around	the	evaluation	of	proposed	periodizations,	and	raises	the	specter	of	possible	cohabitation	of	several	of	periodizations	co-accepted	
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in	parallel.	I	bracket	these	questions	here,	since	anyway	I	am	floating	the	periodizations	in	Tables	3	and	4	mostly	for	illustrative	purposes.		Fourth,	there	will	be	a	temptation	for	contemporary	philosophers	to	ask	how	certain	living	philosophical	giants	–	say,	Saul	Kripke	or	Kit	Fine	–	might	fit	into	the	various	schemes	I	have	put	forward	here.	Such	questions	are	fun	to	play	with,	but	in	truth	I	think	we	should	resist	the	temptation	to	speculate	on	the	historical	significance	of	the	Kripkes	and	Fines	of	the	world,	as	we	simply	lack	the	distance	to	evaluate	their	influence	and	counter-influence	on	the	evolution	of	philosophical	ideas	on	the	timescales	relevant	to	a	history	of	philosophy.	This	point	extends	to	recently	deceased	giants	(say,	David	Lewis)	as	well.	Although	this	is	often	not	the	case	today,	traditionally	academics	in	history	department	have	worked	with	a	moving	wall	of	half	a	century	to	a	century	when	it	comes	to	defining	what	is	history.	This	perfectly	reasonable	rule	of	thumb	would	recommend	silence	for	now	on	the	historical	place	of	the	likes	of	Lewis,	Kripke,	and	Fine.			8.	Conclusion,	with	Coda	on	Non-Western	Philosophy	In	a	way,	my	main	aim	in	this	paper	has	been	to	invite	a	more	critical	approach	to	the	branch	of	philosophy	we	call	history	of	philosophy:	more	critical	both	regarding	its	official	aims	and	regarding	some	of	its	deepest,	most	institutionalized	assumptions,	notably	around	periodization.	I	have	floated	an	expanded	agenda	for	the	historiography	of	philosophy	that	includes	more	global	concerns	with	the	overall	structure	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	and	have	also	recommended	a	more	philosophically	based	approaches	to	the	periodization	of	the	history	of	philosophy.		In	a	more	speculative	vein,	I	have	also	sketched	first-order	proposals	regarding	both	the	overall	structure	of	the	history	of	philosophy	(i.e.,	in	terms	of	the	parallel	developments	of	two	opposing	philosophical	temperaments’	search	for	their	best	articulation)	and	fruitful	periodizations	in	light	of	that	basic	structure	(i.e.,	the	ones	captured	in	Tables	3	and	4).		In	various	places,	I	have	indicated	parenthetically	that	my	subject	matter	is	restricted	to	“Western”	philosophy,	which	designation	typically	covers	European	civilization	and	its	Modern	extension	in	the	Americas.	But	in	truth	geography	has	little	to	do	with	our	subject	matter.	Any	thinker	whose	work	has	the	same	aim	as	what	we	call	philosophy,	and	who	exemplifies	to	an	extent	Temperament	A	or	B,	would	belong	to	the	history	of	philosophy	as	conceived	here.	This	applies	obviously	to	such	figures	as	Iamblicus	the	Syrian	Neoplatonist,	Avicenna	the	Persian	
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Aristotelian,	and	Amo	the	African	Cartesian.	But	it	may	perfectly	well	apply	to	thinkers	who	did	not	engage	the	philosophical	tradition	of	the	West	at	all,	so	long	as	these	thinkers’	intellectual	concerns	and	aims	overlap	sufficiently	with	those	of	the	figures	mentioned	above,	especially	if	their	pursuit	of	these	aims	manifests	elements	of	Temperament	A	and/or	B.	From	this	perspective,	there	is	absolutely	no	reason	not	to	include,	say,	the	6th/7th-century	Indian	philosopher	Dharmakīrti	in	our	B-stream,	given	his	apparent	nominalism	and	empiricism.		It	is	an	open	question,	of	course,	just	what	the	proprietary	aim	of	philosophy	exactly	is.	Different	people	will	have	different	views	on	this	(see	my	“Philosophy	as	Total	Axiomatics”	for	my	own	views).	But	whatever	one’s	view,	it	should	make	it	possible	for	a	historical	figure	entirely	insulated	from	the	European	philosophical	tradition	to	show	up	in	the	same	history	of	philosophy.	Such	a	figure	would	not,	of	course,	participate	in	the	same	causal	web	of	influence	and	counter-influence.	Dharmakīrti’s	nominalism	was	not	influenced	by	Boethius’	and	did	not	influence	Ockham’s.	But	they	may	yet	participate	in	a	separate	web	(Dharmakīrti	is	a	highly	influential	figure	in	Indian	philosophy,	and	was	himself	strongly	influenced	by	Dignāga),	and	anyway	sufficiently	bizarre	circumstances	could	lead	some	European	thinker,	too,	to	be	causally	insulated	in	this	way.	From	this	perspective	there	is	no	reason	why	non-Western	thinkers	could	not	be	placed	within	a	single	global	history	of	philosophy.		At	the	same	time,	presumably	some	intellectual	pursuits,	including	ones	no	less	valuable	than	philosophy,	would	not	qualify	as	philosophical	on	any	minimally	substantive	characterization	of	philosophy’s	distinctive	intellectual	aims.	And	some	of	these	pursuits	could	be	labeled	“philosophy”	despite	their	dissimilarity	to	the	pursuit	shared	by	the	thinkers	we	have	mentioned	here.	In	that	case,	all	sides	may	be	generous	in	allowing	everybody	to	use	the	label,	but	it	would	be	useful	to	keep	in	mind	the	fact	that	different	things	are	being	talked	about.	Almost	half	a	century	ago	now,	Kwasi	Wiredu	argued	that	much	of	what	is	discussed	under	the	banner	of	African	Philosophy	is	in	fact	not	philosophy	at	all:	often	the	gambit	is	to	draw	out	broadly	philosophical	or	cosmological	propositions	implicit	in	collective	myths	and	oral	traditions	specific	to	African	ethnicities,	whereas	philosophical	reflection	is	characterized	precisely	by	the	rigorous	and	analytic	making	explicit	of	ideas	of	some	universal	import.	Of	course	Wiredu	allows	for	the	possibility	of	African	philosophy	in	the	sense	pertinent	to	us	here,	but	for	him	it	is	simply	good	old-fashioned	philosophy	that	happens	to	be	done	by	Africans.	Compare:	when	we	speak	of	European	architecture	versus	Asian	architecture,	we	have	in	mind	a	significant	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	architecture;	but	when	we	speak	of	European	tomatoes	and	Asian	tomatoes,	we	assume	that	tomatoes	are	tomatoes	are	tomatoes	
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and	we	are	simply	keeping	track,	for	whatever	reason,	of	where	some	of	them	come	from.	The	history	of	“Western”	philosophy	is	more	like	a	history	of	Western	tomatoes	than	a	history	of	Western	architecture.		The	point	–	the	point	I	am	adopting	here	from	Wiredu,	that	is	–	is	that,	at	bottom,	philosophy	is	one	–	even	if	it	is	interesting,	for	whatever	reason,	to	keep	track	of	where	in	the	world	that	one	thing	is	done.	Again,	we	do	not	object	to	the	polysemous	use	of	“philosophy”	to	designate	other	intellectual	pursuits.	We	only	insist	that,	in	the	sense	in	which	the	term	“philosophy”	is	used	here,	there	is	no	meaningful	distinction	between	the	history	of	Western	philosophy	and	histories	of	non-Western	philosophies.	Since	philosophy	is	one,	the	history	of	philosophy	is	also	one.1		Works	Referenced	
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